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The worldwide pharmaceutical industry has two major bases of consumption and
production globally: the United States and Europe. In 2004 the US comprised roughly
45 % of the pharmaceutical market worldwide, while Europe comprised about 25 % (1).
In 2006, global spending on prescription drugs topped $600 billion with the US account-
ing for $252 billion of the total annual sales (42 %). However, sales in it and the other
nine biggest markets grew by only 5.7 %. Emerging markets such as China, Russia,
South Korea and Mexico outpaced those markets, growing a whopping 81 % (2).
Clearly, pharmaceutical production and distribution constitute big business. For the
companies the rewards can be substantial. Rates of return on drug company investments
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tend to be higher than many other manufacturing enterprises. As an example, various
studies indicated that US drug companies earned approximately 15 % on their invest-
ments during the 1990’s, a roughly 4 % 'excess' rate of return and much higher than the
average 4 % return earned by Fortune 500 companies during the same decade (3).
But reward is only one side of the story. Drug companies take significant business
risks in the form of R&D and uncertain effectiveness and success of any given medica-
tion. Companies in the industry spend proportionately much more on R&D than firms
in other industrial sectors and their profits tend to be generated by relatively few pro-
ducts in their overall portfolios (3).
There is also the issue of social risk, the focus of this article. Most products have
some sort of 'externality' in the form of costs borne by society but not by the manufac-
turer, e.g. pollution. Social risk for pharmaceutical production is especially pronounced.
An ineffective or, worse, dangerous drug, can have dire consequences for the population
at large.
For this reason, there is elaborate government regulation and oversight of drug sa-
fety and risk. These systems, especially in the US and Europe, will be the main focus of
this paper. The two systems will be described, and then compared and contrasted in terms
of their framing of social risk and the actions governments take to limit it. While for the
moment the US and European regulatory and risk management systems are the most
important in terms of overall production, systems elsewhere, especially in the develop-
ing world, are increasing in relative importance and these will be briefly discussed as
well. Ethical issues that have arisen in these various systems will be surfaced and ana-
lysed. The discussion will close with some conclusions and suggestions for further re-
search.
PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIAL RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The US drug safety and risk management process is managed at the level of the US
federal government with the primary regulatory agency being the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). In the US system of divided executive-legislative authority, the
FDA is responsible for carrying out policy dicta as contained in legislation passed by the
US Congress. The most pertinent laws here are the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act which
created that agency and subsequent acts which extended its powers over prescription
drugs.
Pharmaceutical social risk management can be generally divided into premarket and
postmarket safety regulation. The premarket approach emphasises testing of a given drug
before it goes to market. If the drug 'passes' the required safety tests, it can go to market.
The postmarket approach emphasises actual outcomes once a drug has entered the mar-
ket and gained widespread use. Obviously, the two are not mutually exclusive, but one
can be emphasised over the other.
The US drug safety regulatory system is heavily focused on premarket safety in which
drug companies are required to conduct a series of increasingly large preclinical studies
subject to FDA oversight until it can be established that the drug will have the intended
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desirable effects with minimal unintended undesirable effects. Only at that point can the
drugs be marketed and administered to the general public by prescription (4).
This system has been criticised on a number of fronts. Not least is the fact that the
system is very expensive for drug companies developing new drugs. The consulting firm
Bain & Company has estimated that the cost of discovering, developing and launching a
new drug was nearly US$1.7 billion in 2003 (though these included all expenses, such as
marketing, and not just those associated with testing and other risk management expen-
ditures) (5). Because of this high expenditure, as well as the long-lead times and uncer-
tain outcomes of clinical trialling, it has been argued that drug development in the US
tends to be focussed on 'blockbuster' drugs that will make high profits, possibly to the
detriment of other drugs with lower payoffs but possibly higher public health benefits.
The effectiveness of this system from a safety point of view has also been questio-
ned. The number of subjects in pre-market trials is necessarily limited, so if say, 500 peo-
ple are tested without any adverse effect and the drug then goes to market, it is still qui-
te possible that 1 in 1000 adverse effects might be missed, only to appear after the drug
is introduced for general use. Even with a good clinical trial process, in the US »51 % of
drugs have label changes because of major safety issues discovered after marketing; 20
% of drugs get new black box warnings after marketing; and 3 % to 4 % of drugs are ulti-
mately withdrawn for safety reasons…Yet, when such safety problems have an inciden-
ce of less than 1 in 1000, they do not reflect a failure of the premarketing testing system,
but are predictable. Indeed, previously unknown serious but rare adverse events from
drugs continue to be identified long after they are marketed (e.g., acetyl salicylic acid
and Reye syndrome)« (6).
What this suggests is that (1) unanticipated adverse reactions to a drug are never
going to be entirely avoidable even with substantial and high quality premarket testing,
and (2) postmarket monitoring of drug reactions is perhaps worthy of more emphasis
because this is where many problems are, in fact, discovered and this phase of the prod-
uct lifecycle should be more structured. Postmarketing studies are currently optional in
the United States and the FDA »lacks clear and effective processes for making decisions
about, and providing management oversight of, postmarket safety issues«. The office wi-
thin the FDA with primary responsibility for postmarket safety is the Office of Drug Sa-
fety (ODS), but it has little independent authority of its own, serving mainly as a consul-
tant to the much more premarket focused Office of New Drugs (OND) (4).
Thus many in the US are calling for more postmarket monitoring and regulation.
An expert panel of the National Institute of Medicine (part of the US National Academy
of Sciences) recommended »that Congress ensure that FDA has the ability to require such
postmarketing risk assessment and risk management programs as are needed to moni-
tor and ensure safe use of drug products. These conditions may be imposed both before
and after approval of a new drug, new indication, or new dosage, as well as after identi-
fication of new contraindications or patterns of adverse events. The limitations imposed
should match the specific safety concerns and benefits presented by the drug product«.
(7, Recommendation 5.1). The report also called for establishment of performance goals
for safety over the product lifecycle; increased enforcement authority for the FDA; and
mandatory reporting of premarket trial results (currently voluntary).
Others have been more forceful in calling for change. One author has called for the
scaling back of premarket testing (the current trend is for regulators to expand the num-
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ber of preclinical trials and number of trial participants) to be replaced by mandatory
postmarket studies, with an initial postmarket period carrying only conditional appro-
val of the drug by regulators for limited prescriptions with full warnings to patients that
postmarket studies have not been completed. Only after satisfactory completion of the
postmarket conditional trial would there be full drug approval. A schematic presenta-
tion of the current and trend US drug risk management model and this proposed change
to it is provided in Fig. 1.
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIAL RISK IN EUROPE
European drug risk management has been taking a somewhat different trajectory.
»European« in this context refers to the frameworks issued by the European Union. Ob-
viously, there are many individual country regulations within Europe still in the process
of being harmonised. Here, a principle garnered from environmental risk analysis is gai-
ning currency, namely 'the precautionary principle'. One author argues that »Whereas
traditional risk assessment is best applied to situations characterised by risk, its propo-
nents assert that the precautionary principle is needed to address uncertainty, ambiguity
and ignorance«. Risk is defined as a condition where it is possible to define both the set
of possible outcomes and the probabilities associated with each member of that set, whe-
reas the other conditions – uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance – have progressively
fewer defined dimensions, with ignorance being the extreme case of not knowing either
the possible outcomes or, necessarily, their probabilities. A scheme for the four possible
conditions is laid out in Fig 2.
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Fig. 1. Alternative models for studying drug safety: top – traditional model, middle – evolving mo-
del, bottom – proposed model. Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of study participants.
Adapted from ref. 8.
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Fig. 2. Knowledge about likelihoods and outcomes: for possible conditions. Adapted from ref. 6.
The European Commission in 2000 recognised the principle in a guideline stating
that where [regulatory] action is deemed necessary, measures based on the precaution-
ary principle should be, inter alia:
– proportional to the chosen level of protection,
– non-discriminatory in their application,
– consistent with similar measures already taken,
– based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action
(including, where appropriate and feasible, an economic cost/benefit analysis),
– subject to review, in the light of new scientific data, and
– capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence necessary
for a more comprehensive risk assessment (8).
The basic thrust of the precautionary principle, and regulations such as those which
attempt to implement them, is that there should be a presumption in favour of protect-
ing the public good (however defined) instead of presuming that proposed actions (such
as new drugs) are 'innocent until proven guilty'. This is in contrast to the notions of risk
analysis, which takes a more neutral stance towards innovations of various sorts, implic-
itly holding that benefits and costs need to be (and can be) measured first before decid-
ing to reject or accept a given option.
This principle has not yet taken widespread hold in European regulation of phar-
maceuticals, though it is used, and was developed first in environmental regulation. The
precautionary principle is quite conservative in that it effectively asks that »no harm be
done« but that, of course, it is one of the main objections to be made to it, namely that
scientific innovation may be impeded by its application. Also, there may be profound
unintended consequences where an application of the principle might result in holding
on of old and harmful technologies. Additionally, the principle is generally quite vague
in its application.
A NOTE ON THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Already mentioned is the fact that the fastest growth in pharmaceuticals is not in
America or Europe but in developing countries. A detailed review of social risk manage-
ment in these markets is outside the scope of this limited review but of obvious impor-
tance to policymakers going forward simply because so much growth is occurring in tho-
se markets.
For example, in 1998, the US State of Connecticut spent more on health than the 38
low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa combined. However, middle-income devel-
oping countries had a greater share than low income countries. The Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) estimated that in 1998 7 % of their total
markets were in Southeast Asia and China, and 7.5 % were in Latin America (9).
Since then, the developing world, middle-income countries in particular, have grown
in relative importance as their share of world output and consumption grows. In partic-
ular, countries like India, Israel, Thailand, Brazil have developed significant domestic
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pharmaceutical industries, some of which have become international producers. An Is-
raeli company is now one of the twenty largest pharmaceutical corporations worldwide
in terms of sales and two Indian companies rank in the top fifty (10).
Of course the, 'developing world' consists of multiple national markets with vary-
ing degrees of risk regulation that differ significantly from one another. This would sug-
gest that there are a significant number of new fronts, so to speak, which need to be con-
sidered in social risk regulation.
However, the dominant market positions are still held by American and European
producers, who develop and supply most of the significant drugs worldwide. Develop-
ing world firms are typically developing generic or specialised versions of medicines that
have already been subject to American or European government oversight. Additiona-
lly, domestic sourcing is often not the issue so much as obtaining supply directly from
foreign multinationals at prices affordable to developing world users. Nonetheless, the
trend is clear: pharmaceutical social risk management is rapidly becoming variegated.
THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL RISK REGULATION REGIMES FOR MEDICINES
Having described some of the issues surrounding the efficacy of various social risk
regulation regimes, one may ask a more normative question: are these regimes 'moral' or
'ethical' in their content and outcomes?
What is »ethics«? One source holds ethics to refer to a standard of behavior, a con-
ception of right or wrong conduct (11). Fine so far as it goes, but it must be asked: what
are the sources of »right« and »wrong«?
»Right« and »wrong« are concepts that fall under the rubric of morality, which a
dictionary definition rather circularly holds to be »the degree of conformity of an idea,
practice, etc., to moral principles« (12). A little bit more helpful is the definition of »mo-
ral«, which is »concerned with accepted rules and standards of general conduct« (12).
Thus, one can say that ethical principles are guides to moral or immoral behaviour
and morality itself defines what is »right« and what is »wrong«. Business ethics, mean-
while, is simply the application of the foregoing ideas to business settings.
Where fundamental moral and ethical definitions come from has been a topic of phi-
losophical debate for thousands of years. Two basic approaches that form the basis for
ethical thinking are deontology, which embodies the view that ethical decisions follow
absolute principles (i.e., that actions are inherently right or wrong, regardless of their con-
sequences, an approach most famously associated with the philosopher Immanuel
Kant); and consequentialism, which bases its judgment of any action on the goodness of
its consequences (13).
This brief conceptual discussion by itself surfaces one salient fact: social risk regula-
tion of medicines is rather fundamentally consequentialist rather than Kantian. Both EU
and American drug policies speak explicitly of outcomes, and regulations are designed
to maximise the occurrence of 'positive' outcomes and minimise the occurrence of 'nega-
tive' outcomes.
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Indeed, the thorniest part of many ethical analyses, namely, choosing an ethical
standard, may be most straightforward with social risk regulation of medicine. Medi-
cines, after all, are designed to improve health and reduce disease and these are very
clear benchmarks against which to design social risk management policies. Clinical tri-
als are intended to surface efficacy (does the product achieve the positive health benefits
claimed for it?) and unintended consequences (generally answering the question of whe-
ther the product results in harm to the user, though trials do sometime reveal unexpec-
ted positive side benefits). Indeed, the very purpose of medicine is outcome-based: it
has no particular meaning or significance otherwise.
If one can safely assume a consequentialist frame for ethical analysis, the next nor-
mative question is whether current social risk regulatory regimes are achieving maxi-
mum benefit and minimum cost.
One could break this question into two parts: conceptual integrity and implementa-
tion integrity. On the conceptual front, a key ethical concern with American pharmaceu-
tical regulation centres on its premarket bias. Clearly, there are significant problems with
such a bias in that most negative drug effects are revealed after they are widely prescri-
bed and used rather than before. Closer monitoring of postmarket drug effects has been
loudly called for in the US for this very reason.
The general European approach (here referring to the EU rather than specific varia-
tions within European nations) recognises this problem implicitly with its precautionary
principle. In a certain sense, this principle is an explicit rebuff to the notion that drugs,
even drugs heavily tested in the premarket phase, are 'innocent until proven guilty'. In
fact, the precautionary principle assumes that 'foreign' human-made and human-intro-
duced substances must be assumed to cause harm unless there is very good reason to as-
sume otherwise. US figures that show upward of 180,000 pharmaceutical induced deaths
annually perhaps illustrate the wisdom of such caution (though some of these deaths are
due to improperly administered drugs rather than defects in the drugs themselves) (14).
Of course, in consequentialist systems there are benefits and costs: drugs cause
harm but they also deliver benefit and, clearly, for many types of drugs many more are
saved than are hurt. A broad consequentialist measure of 'greatest good for the greatest
number' probably indicates that current social risk regulation regimes are net positive,
though perhaps with significant room for improvement. But society may have concerns
about 'innocent' victims, young, poor, disadvantaged people and the like. Making dis-
tinctions between classes of people is obviously contentious but there are often underly-
ing concerns about unintended consequences, i.e., that some users expecting positive re-
sults were 'betrayed' by negative consequences, perhaps deemed a worse wrong than a
user who was faced with clear risks and benefits and made a conscious choice.
This segues into the implementation dimension. The precautionary principle sounds
robust – but how does one actually implement it in such a way that useful drugs are not
delayed or perhaps not introduced at all? Similarly, in the US, how would postmarket
studies actually work? For example, would people in the general population be exposed
to unknown risks and in large numbers? Beyond this, drug companies are known for be-
ing quite influential in the policy-making and medical communities, giving large dona-
tions in many cases to political leaders and providing many material benefits to doctors
or other potential prescribers. Social risk regulations may be well-designed but some ar-
gue are skewed by factors such as these toward industry rather than general interests.
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CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A number of hypotheses are suggested by this brief review. First, social risk regula-
tion of pharmaceuticals lends itself naturally to a consequentialist ethical framework. In-
deed medicines are inherently bound up with positive outcomes, meaning little in a
framework that ignores such outcomes.
Second, a broad 'greatest number for the greatest good' framework may be a good
starting point when considering the design of overall social risk management systems.
Indeed, current US and European debates seem very much to pivot on issues of gross
benefit net of gross cost.
Third, below this gross level, a consequentalist framework will likely have to be more
varied as specific scenarios are considered where some affected groups are deemed mo-
re or less important than others. For example, developing world populations in some
cases may be deemed as having greater need than developed world populations in the
distribution and pricing of a given drug.
Fourth, and related to the prior point, non-consequentalist values may well enter in
for these specific cases (e.g., 'innocent' subjects should not be used in postmarket studies
even if their use might yield greater benefits than would be otherwise realised). Of cour-
se, these value discussions will be highly charged.
Fifth, and finally with respect to future research, explicit benefit-cost ethical analy-
ses might be desirable, both for overall risk management systems and in specific instan-
ces. There are many clinically based analyses of this sort but very few ethical analyses,
even though ethical issues are, at least implicitly, often paramount.
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S A @ E T A K
Me|unarodni propisi o farmaceutskom dru{tvenom riziku: Eti~ko gledi{te
CAMERON GORDON
Proizvodnja i distribucija lijekova vrlo je unosan posao. Za djelovanje farmaceutskih
tvrtki bitna je dobit. Financijska ulaganja i povrat investicija u farmaceutskoj industriji
ve}i su nego u drugim djelatnostima. Ali profit je samo jedna strana pri~e. Postoji i veliki
dru{tveni rizik, o ~emu }e biti rije~i u ovom ~lanku. Dru{tveni rizik u farmaceutskoj proi-
zvodnji je posebno nagla{en. Neu~inkoviti, ili jo{ gore, opasni lijekovi, mogu imati po-
gubne posljedice za cijelo stanovni{tvo. Zbog toga na dr`avnoj razini postoji regulativa i
nadzor nad sigurnosti i rizikom uporabe lijekova. Ti sustavi, posebno sustavi u SAD-u i
Europi, u fokusu su ovog ~lanka. Ta su dva nadzorna sustava opisana i uspore|ena u
svjetlu ograni~avanja dru{tvenog rizika i mjera koje vlade poduzimaju kako bi ih ogra-
ni~ile. Drugi sustavi, posebice u zemljama u razvoju, dobivaju sve vi{e na zna~aju i uk-
ratko su opisani. Prikazani su i analizirani eti~ki principi u drugim sustavima. Rad zavr-
{ava sa zaklju~cima i prijedlozima za daljnja istra`ivanja.
Klju~ne rije~i: rizik, objektivnost, farmaceutska industrija, regulativa lijekova, dru{tveni rizik, poli-
tika lijekova, etika, kolektivna dru{tvena odgovornost
Faculty of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Bruce, ACT 2601 Australia
23
C. Gordon: International pharmaceutical social risk regulation: An ethical perspective, Acta Pharm. 61 (2011) 15–23.
